We introduce boundedly-rational expectations into a standard asset-pricing model of the exchange rate, where cross-country interest rate di¤erentials are governed by Taylortype rules. Agents augment a lagged-information random walk forecast with a term that captures news about Taylor-rule fundamentals. The coe¢ cient on fundamental news is pinned down using the moments of observable data such that the resulting forecast errors are close to white noise. The model generates volatility and persistence that is remarkably similar to that observed in monthly exchange rate data for Canada, Japan, and the U.K. Regressions performed on model-generated data can deliver the well-documented forward premium anomaly.
1 Introduction on the prior interest rate di¤erential is exactly equal to one. This prediction of the theory, known as the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, is grossly violated in the data. As shown by Fama (1984) , regressions of the observed exchange rate change on the prior interest rate di¤erential yield estimated slope coe¢ cients that are typically negative and signi…cantly di¤erent from one. Like the other two puzzles, the forward-premium anomaly has stood the test of time. 4 The wrong sign of the slope coe¢ cient in UIP regressions can be reconciled with noarbitrage and rational expectations if investors demand a particular type of risk premium to compensate for holding an uncovered currency position. By failing to account for the risk premium, the standard UIP regression (which assumes risk-neutral investors) may deliver a biased estimate of the slope coe¢ cient. 5 Recently, Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) provide some evidence that carry-trade pro…ts (excess returns from betting against UIP) may re ‡ect a compensation for risk that stems from a negative correlation between the carry-trade pro…ts and investors' consumption-based marginal utility. 6 However, Burnside (2011) points out that their empirical model is subject to weak identi…cation such that there is no concrete evidence for the postulated connection between carry-trade pro…ts and fundamental risk. Moreover, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) show that there is no statistically signi…cant covariance between carry-trade pro…ts and conventional risk factors. Verdelhan (2010) develops a rational model with time-varying risk premiums along the lines of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . The model implies that rational domestic investors will expect low future returns on risky foreign bonds in good times (due to an expected appreciation of the domestic currency) when risk premia are low and domestic interest rates are high relative to foreign interest rates. Hence, the model delivers the prediction that the domestic currency will appreciate, on average, when domestic interest rates are high-thus violating the UIP condition, as in the data. Unfortunately, the idea that investors expect low future returns on risky assets in good times is strongly contradicted by a wide variety of survey evidence from both stock and real estate markets. The survey evidence shows that investors typically expect high future returns on risky assets in good times, not low future returns. 7 Overall, the evidence suggests that rationally time-varying risk premiums are not a convincing explanation for the empirical failure of UIP.
This paper develops a model that can account for numerous quantitative features of realworld exchange rates, including the three anomalies described above. The key aspect of our approach is the way in which agents' expectations are modeled. Starting from a standard asset-pricing model of the exchange rate, we postulate that agents augment a simple random 4 For recent evidence, see Baillie and Chang (2011) and Baillie and Cho (2014) . 5 See Engel (1996) for a survey of this large literature and Engel (2014) for a review of new developments in this …eld. 6 See also Lustig et al. (2014) . 7 For additional details, see Amromin and Sharpe (2014) , Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) , Jurgilas and Lansing (2013) , and Williams (2013). walk forecast with news about fundamentals. Fundamentals in our model are determined by cross-country interest rate di¤erentials which, in turn, are described by Taylor-type rules, along the lines of West (2005, 2006) . We solve for a "consistent expectations equilibrium," in which the coe¢ cient on fundamental news in the agent's subjective forecast rule is pinned down using the observed covariance between exchange rate changes and fundamental news. This learnable equilibrium delivers the result that the forecast errors observed by an agent are close to white noise, making it di¢ cult to detect any misspeci…cation of the subjective forecast rule. 8 We demonstrate that our consistent expectations model can generate volatility and persistence that is remarkably similar to that observed in monthly bilateral exchange rate data (relative to the U.S.) for Canada, Japan, and the U.K. over the period 1974 to 2012. We show that regressions performed on model-generated data can deliver the forward-premium anomaly, whereby a high interest rate currency tends to appreciate, thus violating the UIP condition. Moreover, the estimated slope coe¢ cient in the model regressions can vary over a wide range when estimated using a 15-year (180-month) rolling sample period. This result is consistent with the wide range of coe¢ cient estimates observed across countries and time periods in the data. 9 In our model, agents'perceived law of motion (PLM) for the exchange rate is a driftless random walk that is modi…ed to include an additional term involving fundamental news, i.e., the innovation to the AR(1) driving process that is implied by the Taylor-rule based interest rate di¤erential. To maintain generality regarding agents' information sets, we allow a fraction of market participants to construct the random walk component of the forecast using contemporaneous information about the exchange rate while the remainder employ lagged information about the exchange rate. The agents'PLM has only one parameter that can be estimated within the model by running a regression of the exchange rate change on fundamental news, both of which are observable to the agent. 10 The agents' subjective forecast rule can be viewed as boundedly-rational because the resulting actual law of motion (ALM) for the exchange rate exhibits a near-unit root with innovations that depend on Taylor-rule fundamentals.
We show that regardless of the starting value for the coe¢ cient on fundamental news in the subjective forecast rule, a standard real-time learning algorithm will converge to the vicinity of the …xed point which de…nes the unique consistent expectations (CE) equilibrium. The backward-looking nature of the agent's forecast rule when using lagged exchange rate information is the crucial element needed to generate the forward-premium anomaly. By introducing a large forecast weight on the lagged exchange rate, the CE model shifts the temporal relationship between the expected exchange rate change and the interest rate di¤erential, thus ‡ipping the sign of the slope coe¢ cient in the UIP regression.
Our setup is motivated by two important features of the data: (1) real-world exchange rates exhibit near-random walk behavior, and (2) exchange rates and fundamentals do exhibit some tenuous empirical links. For example, Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2003) employ high frequency data to show that fundamental macroeconomic news surprises induce shifts in the exchange rate. When we apply the CE model's forecast rule to exchange rate data for Canada, Japan, and the U.K. (relative to the U.S. dollar), we …nd that the inclusion of fundamental news together with the lagged exchange rate can typically improve forecast accuracy relative to an otherwise similar random walk forecast that omits the fundamental news term.
Using consensus survey data of a large number of …nancial institutions that report 3-month ahead forecasts of exchange rates (relative to the U.S.) for Canada, Japan, and the U.K., we show that changes in the interest rate di¤erential (a proxy for fundamental news) are helpful in explaining the forecasted changes in the exchange rates-a result that is consistent with the CE model's forecast rule. In particular, the data shows that survey respondents tend to forecast a currency appreciation during periods when the change of interest rate di¤erential is positive. The CE model's forecast rule is also consistent with survey data which shows that the vast majority of professional forecasters use both technical analysis (chart patterns of past exchange rate movements) and fundamental economic data to construct their exchange rate forecasts (Dick and Menkho¤ 2013 and Ter Ellen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels 2013) .
Related Literature
This paper relates to some previous literature that has employed models with distorted beliefs to account for the behavior of exchange rates. Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) postulate that agents have distorted beliefs about the law of motion for fundamentals. Related mechanisms are proposed by ), Ilut (2012 ), and Yu (2013 . In contrast, we postulate that agents have distorted beliefs about the law of motion for exchange rates, not fundamentals. The distorted beliefs in our model a¤ect not only the dynamics of the exchange rate, but also the dynamics of the equilibrium interest rate di¤erential via the Taylor-type rule. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2007) introduce "random walk expectations" into an exchange rate model with risk aversion and infrequent portfolio adjustments. Unlike our setup, the agent's subjective forecast in their model completely ignores fundamentals. While their model can account for the forward-premium anomaly, it relies on exogenous shocks from ad hoc noise traders to account for the observed volatility of exchange rate changes. Chakraborty and Evans (2008) introduce constant-gain learning about the reduced-form law of motion for the exchange rate. The agent in their model employs the correct (i.e., ra- tional) form for the law of motion, but the estimated parameters are perpetually updated using recent data. They show that statistical variation in the estimated parameters may cause the UIP condition to be violated, particularly in small samples. However, their model does not account for excess volatility of the exchange rate. Mark (2009) develops a model with perpetual learning about the Taylor-rule coe¢ cients that govern the cross-country interest rate di¤erential. He shows that the model can account for major swings in the real deutschemark/euro-dollar exchange rate over the period 1976 to 2007. A drawback of perpetual learning models is that the gain parameter (which governs the weight on recent data in the agent's forecast rule) is not pinned down within the model itself. In contrast, our consistent expectations approach employs no free parameters in the agents'subjective forecast rules.
The subjective forecast rules in our model can be interpreted as being comprised of both chartist and fundamentalist elements. In that sense, our setup is related to a large literature on forecast switching models with heterogenous interacting agents, i.e., chartist versus fundamentalist-type traders. 11 Again, the distinguishing feature of our approach is that agents' forecast rule parameters are not exogenous, but instead are pinned down within the model by the consistent expectations equilibrium concept. 
Data on Exchange Rates and Fundamentals
According to UIP theory, the cross-country interest rate di¤erential should be a key explanatory variable for subsequent exchange rate changes. Figure 1 plots scatter diagrams of monthly bilateral exchange rate changes (in annualized percent) versus the prior month's average short-term nominal interest rate di¤erential (in percent) for three pairs of countries, namely, Canada/U.S., Japan/U.S. and U.K./U.S. The data covers the period from January 1974 through October 2012. 12 The bottom right panel of Figure 1 shows a scatter diagram of the pooled data. Figure 2 shows time series plots of the same data, with the bottom right panel depicting the relative volatility of exchange rate changes to interest rate di¤erentials, where volatilities are computed using a 15-year rolling sample period.
Three aspects of Figures 1 and 2 stand out. First, there is no tight systematic relationship between monthly exchange rate changes and the prior month's interest rate di¤erential (exchange rate disconnect puzzle). Second, the volatility of exchange rate changes is 10 to 40 times higher than the volatility of the interest rate di¤erential (excess volatility puzzle). Third, the dashed lines in Figure 1 show a negative slope in the …tted relationship between the ob- served exchange rate change and the prior month's interest rate di¤erential (forward-premium anomaly).
The top left panel of Figure 3 plots the interest rate di¤erentials that are used to predict exchange rate changes via a standard UIP regression that takes the form:
where s t log (S t ) is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate and s t+1 s t+1 s t is the monthly percent change (annualized) from period t to t + 1: The short-term nominal interest rate di¤erential is i t i t , where i t is the rate for either Canada, Japan, or the U.K. and i t is the U.S. interest rate. Under UIP (which assumes rational expectations and risk-neutral investors), we have 0 = 0 and 1 = 1; with the error term " t+1 re ‡ecting white-noise rational forecast errors. The remaining panels of Figure 3 plot the estimated slope coe¢ cients 1 for each country together with the associated standard error bands using a 15-year rolling sample period. The horizontal dashed lines mark the values 1 = 1 and 1 = 0: For all three countries, the rolling estimates of 1 lie mostly in negative territory, thus violating the UIP condition. Table 1 provides the full-sample estimates for 1 : The point estimates are all negative, consistent with …tted lines shown in Figure 1 . Moreover, the 95 percent con…dence intervals based on the reported standard errors exclude the theoretical prediction of 1 = 1 in their coverages. 13 The consistently negative estimates for 1 reported here and elsewhere in the literature have interesting economic implications. In practice, the results imply that a carry-trade strategy (taking a long position in high-interest currency while shorting a low-interest currency) can deliver substantial excess returns, where excess returns are measured by (i t i t ) s t+1 : When 1 < 1; the future excess return can be predicted using the current interest rate di¤erential i t i t ; which raises doubts about market e¢ ciency. 14 E¤orts to account for the predictability of excess returns in the data can be classi…ed into two main approaches: (1) linking excess returns to some form of compensation for bearing risk, or (2) allowing for departures from fully-rational expectations. Empirical evidence using conventional risk factors argues against the …rst approach (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011) . In this paper, we follow the second approach.
Another notable feature of the UIP regressions, evident in Figure 3 , is the substantial time variation in the estimated slope coe¢ cient for a given country. Baillie and Chang (2011) and Baillie and Cho (2014) employ time-varying parameter regressions to capture this feature of the data. Bansal (1997) shows that the sign of 1 appears to be correlated with the sign of the interest rate di¤erential, but his results do not generalize to other sample periods or countries. Ding and Ma (2013) develop a model of cross-border portfolio reallocation that can help explain a time-varying 1 estimate. Our model can deliver a negative and statistically signi…cant estimate of 1 in long-sample regressions as well as substantial time-variation in the estimated slope coe¢ cient in 15-year rolling regressions. The time variation in the estimated slope coe¢ cient arises for two reasons: (1) the actual law of motion that governs s t+1 in the consistent expectations equilibrium turns out to di¤er in signi…cant ways from the UIP regression equation (1), and (2) the volatility of s t+1 in the consistent expectations equilibrium is much higher than the volatility of i t i t :
Model
The framework for our analysis is a standard asset-pricing model of the exchange rate. Fundamentals are given by cross-country interest rate di¤erentials which, in turn, are described by Taylor-type rules, in the spirit of West (2005, 2006) . Given our data, the home country in the model represents either Canada, Japan, or the U.K. while the foreign country represents the United States (denoted by variables).
We postulate that the home country central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-type rule
where i t is the short term nominal interest rate, t is the in ‡ation rate (log di¤erence of the price level), y t is the output gap (log deviation of actual output from potential output), s t is the log of the nominal exchange rate (home currency relative to the U.S. dollar), s t 1 is the lagged exchange rate, and s t p t p t is a benchmark exchange rate implied by the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition, where p t is the domestic price level and p t is the foreign price level. 15 When = 0; the central bank reacts to s t s t which is the deviation of the exchange rate from the PPP benchmark, consistent with the models employed by West (2005, 2006) . When = 1; the central bank reacts to the exchange rate change s t = s t s t 1 ; consistent with the empirical policy rule estimates of Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) for a variety of industrial countries. Motivated by the empirical evidence, we set ' 1. 16 The term t represents an exogenous monetary policy shock. In contrast to West (2005, 2006) , we allow for interest-rate smoothing on the part of the central bank, as governed by the parameter > 0: For the remaining reaction function parameters, we follow standard practice in assuming g > 1; and g y ; g s > 0: In other words, the central bank responds more than one-for-one to movements in in ‡ation and raises the nominal interest rate in response to a larger output gap or a depreciating home currency ( s t > 0).
The foreign (i.e., U.S.) central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate according to
where we assume that the reaction function parameters ; g ; and g y are the same across countries. Subtracting equation (3) from equation (2) yields the following expression for the cross-country interest rate di¤erential
Assuming risk-neutral, rational investors, the uncovered interest rate parity condition implies
where E t s t+1 is the rational forecast of next period's log exchange rate. 17 The UIP condition says that a negative interest rate di¤erential i t i t < 0 will exist when rational investors expect a home currency appreciation, i.e., when E t s t+1 < s t : The expected appreciation compensates investors for the opportunity cost of holding a low interest rate domestic bond rather than a high interest rate foreign bond. Rational expectations implies E t s t+1 = s t+1 " t+1 , where " t+1 is a white-noise forecast error. Hence, theory predicts that, on average, a low interest rate currency should appreciate relative to a high interest rate currency such that E (s t+1 s t ) < 0: Substituting the cross-country interest rate di¤erential (4) into the UIP condition (5) and solving for s t yields the following no-arbitrage condition that determines the equilibrium exchange rate
where b is the e¤ective discount factor and x t is the fundamental driving variable de…ned as
; (7) where we have made the substitution s t = p t p t . 18 The no-arbitrage condition (6) shows that the equilibrium exchange rate s t depends on the agent's conditional forecast E t s t+1 ; the lagged exchange rate s t 1 , and the fundamental driving variable x t . When 0 < 1; the sum of the coe¢ cients on E t s t+1 and s t 1 is less than unity which ensures the existence of a unique rational expectations solution. The general form of equation (6), whereby the current value of an endogenous variable depends in part on its own expected value and a lagged value appears in a wide variety of economic models, such as the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve (Galí, et al. 2005) .
The macroeconomic variables that enter the de…nition of x t exhibit a high degree of persistence in the data. We therefore model the behavior of the fundamental driving variable using the following stationary AR(1) process
between a unit root process and one that is stationary but highly persistent given a …nite sample size (Cochrane 1991) .
Given values for x t and s t ; we can recover the current-period interest rate di¤erential as follows
Empirical estimates of central bank reaction functions typically imply values in the range of 0.8-0.9 together with small values for g s such that b ' 1: In this case, the equilibrium dynamics for i t i t will be very similar to the equilibrium dynamics for x t : We will make use of the inverse relationship between the interest rate di¤erential and the fundamental driving variable x t in our discussion of the results.
Rational Expectations
Proposition 1 shows that the no-arbitrage condition (6) delivers a unique rational expectation solution. Proposition 1. When fundamentals are governed by equation (8), there is unique solution to the no-arbitrage condition (6) under rational expectations (RE), as given by
Proof : See Appendix A.
Our parameter restriction 0 < 1 implies the result 0 a s < (1 b) =b: When b ' 1; the equilibrium coe¢ cient on the lagged exchange rate must be a small positive number such that a s ' 0: The result 0
When b and are both close to unity, the equilibrium coe¢ cient a x will turn out to be a relatively large positive number. Since a s ' 0; the equilibrium exchange rate approximately inherits the persistence properties of the fundamental driving variable x t . Since x t is very persistent in the data, the RE model predicts a persistent exchange rate level. 19 The unconditional moments for s t and s t implied by the RE model are contained in Appendix B. The UIP condition (5) together with the assumption of rational expectations implies V ar (i t i t ) = Cov ( s t+1 ; i t i t ) : Hence, the RE model predicts the following slope coe¢ cient from a UIP regression
Consistent Expectations
Real-world exchange rates exhibit near-random walk behavior. A naive forecast rule that uses only the most recently-observed exchange rate almost always outperforms a fundamentalsbased forecast (Rossi 2013) . In addition to its predictive accuracy, a random walk forecast has the advantage of economizing on computational and informational resources. As described many years ago by Nerlove (1983) , "Purposeful economic agents have incentives to eliminate errors up to a point justi…ed by the costs of obtaining the information necessary to do so...The most readily available and least costly information about the future value of a variable is its past value" (p. 1255). Still, there is evidence that market participants pay attention to fundamentals. A recent study by Dick and Menkho¤ (2013) uses survey data to analyze the methods of nearly 400 professional exchange rate forecasters. The data shows that the vast majority of forecasters use both technical analysis (chart patterns of past exchange rate movements) and fundamental economic data to construct their forecasts. Another study of survey data by ter Ellen, et al. (2014) …nds evidence that large wholesale investors in the foreign exchange market employ both chartist and fundamentals-based forecasting strategies.
To capture the above ideas, we postulate that agents'perceived law of motion (PLM) for the exchange rate is given by
where u t represents "fundamental news," as measured by the innovation to the AR(1) fundamental driving process (8). There is only one parameter that agents in the model can readily estimate by running a regression of s t on u t : The PLM can be interpreted as being comprised of both chartist and fundamentalist elements. The presence of the lagged exchange rate s t 1 re ‡ects the chartist element while the news term u t re ‡ects the fundamentalist element. The PLM also captures the idea that a fundamental news shock u t can induce a signi…cant and immediate jump in the exchange rate, consistent with the …ndings of Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2003) who employ high frequency data. The PLM is used by agents to construct a subjective forecast b E t s t+1 which takes the place of the rational forecast E t s t+1 in the no-arbitrage condition (6). Following Yu (2013) , p. 476. our solution procedure implies that the no-arbitrage condition "holds ex ante under investors'perception." But ex post, the exchange rate evolves according to the actual law of motion (ALM) to be derived below. 20 Since the no-arbitrage condition implies that s t depends on the agent's own subjective forecast, it is questionable whether an agent could make use of the contemporaneous value s t when constructing a forecast in real-time. To deal with this timing issue, models that employ adaptive learning or other forms of boundedly-rational expectations typically assume that agents can only make use of the lagged realization of the forecast variable (in this case s t 1 ) when constructing their subjective forecast at time t. 21 A lagged-information setup avoids simultaneity in the determination of the actual and expected values of the forecast variable.
Here we wish to maintain generality regarding agents' information. We postulate that a fraction of market participants (labeled Type-1 agents) employ contemporaneous information about the exchange rate while the remaining fraction 1 (labeled Type-2 agents) employ lagged information, where 0 < 1. 22 As in the RE solution, we assume that both Type-1 and Type-2 agents have access to contemporaneous information about the fundamental driving variable x t : According to the de…nition (7), x t does not not depend on s t and hence there is no controversy about including it in the information sets of both Type-1 and Type-2 agents. A long history of observations of x t would allow both types of agents to discover the stochastic process (8). Given this knowledge, both types of agents could infer the fundamental news u t from sequential observations of x t and x t 1 :
From the PLM (11), the subjective forecast of Type-1 agents is given by
which coincides with a random walk forecast because the Type-1 agents' knowledge of fundamentals implies b E 1;t u t+1 = 0: Since Type-2 agents employ lagged information about the exchange rate, their PLM must be iterated ahead two periods to obtain
which makes use of the lagged exchange rate s t 1 : Finally, we assume that the aggregate market forecast is given by the following population-weighted average of the two agent types:
where s t is a momentum term that derives from aggregating across agents with di¤erent information sets.
Substituting the aggregate market forecast (14) into the no-arbitrage condition (6) and solving for s t yields the following actual law of motion for the exchange rate
2 1 For an overview of these methods, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , Hommes (2013) , and Hommes and Zhu (2014) .
2 2 Adam, Evans and Honkapohja (2006) employ a similar generalization of agents'information sets in a model of adaptive learning applied to hyperin ‡ation. where x t is governed by (8). Notice that the form of the ALM is similar, but not identical, to the RE model solution from Proposition 1. Recall that we previously showed that the equilibrium coe¢ cient on the lagged exchange rate in the RE model must be a small positive number such that a s ' 0: In the CE model, the parameter restriction 0 < 1 implies that the equilibrium coe¢ cient on the lagged exchange rate has a lower bound of b (1 ) = (1 b ) when = 0: This lower bound is close to unity when b ' 1: Since the equilibrium coe¢ cient on s t 1 in the CE model is near unity, the agents'perception of a unit root in the exchange rate via the PLM (11) turns out to be close to self-ful…lling. Hence we can say that agents are forecasting in a way that, ex post, appears to be near-rational.
De…ning the Consistent Expectations Equilibrium
We now de…ne a "consistent expectations equilibrium"along the lines of Hommes and Sorger (1998) and Hommes and Zhu (2014) . Speci…cally, the parameter in the agents'PLM (11) is pinned down using the moments of observable data. Since the PLM presumes that s t exhibits a unit root, agents in the model can readily estimate as follows
where Cov ( s t ; u t ) and 2 u = V ar (u t ) can be computed from observable data. An analytical expression for the observable covariance can be derived from the ALM (15) which implies:
Equations (16) and (18) can be combined to form the following de…nition of equilibrium.
De…nition 1. A consistent expectations (CE) equilibrium is de…ned as a perceived law of motion (11), an aggregate market forecast (14), an actual law of motion (15), and a subjective forecast parameter ; such that the equilibrium value is given by the unique …xed point of the linear map
where b 1= [1 + (1 )g s ] < 1 is the e¤ ective discount factor and 0 < 1 is the fraction of agents who employ lagged information about the exchange rate.
Interestingly, the …xed point value depends only on the e¤ective discount factor b and not on which measures the fraction of Type-1 agents who employ contemporaneous information about s t . But as we shall see, does in ‡uence other results, such as the theoretical slope coe¢ cient from a UIP regression. The slope of the T ( ) map determines whether the equilibrium is stable under learning. The slope is given by T 0 ( ) = b(1 )= (1 b ) : Since 0 < T 0 ( ) < 1; the CE equilibrium is globally stable. In Section 4, we demonstrate that a real-time learning algorithm always converges to the vicinity of the theoretical …xed point regardless of the shock sequences or the starting value for .
Implications for the Forward-Premium Anomaly
The unconditional moments implied by the actual laws of motion (15) and (17) turn out to be quite complicated, as shown in Appendix C. It is useful to consider what happens to these moments when the e¤ective discount factor approaches unity. When b ! 1 the equilibrium exchange rate exhibits a unit root. From equation (17), the actual law of motion becomes s t = u t + x t = (1 ) where x t = (i t i t ) from equation (9). In this case, the analytical slope coe¢ cient from a UIP regression is given by
which demonstrates that the CE model can deliver a negative slope coe¢ cient, thus reproducing the well-documented forward-premium anomaly. When all agents are Type-2 (employ lagged information), we have = 0 and the slope coe¢ cient equals : However, when some agents are Type-1 (employ contemporaneous information), we have 0 < < 1 and the slope coe¢ cient can become more negative than . When 0 < b < 1; the slope coe¢ cient remains negative, but is smaller in magnitude than in the limiting case of b ! 1: Two out of the three empirical slope coe¢ cients reported in Table 1 are below 1 which would suggest a calibration with > 0. We will con…rm these results numerically in the quantitative analysis presented in Section 5.
The intuition for the forward-premium anomaly in the CE model is not complicated. For simplicity, let us consider the case where all agents are Type-2 such that = 0: From equation (14), the aggregate market forecast becomes b E t s t+1 = s t 1 + u t : Subtracting s t from both sides of this expression yields b E t s t+1 s t = s t + u t . In contrast, any rational expectations model implies E t s t+1 = s t+1 " t+1 , where " t+1 is the white noise rational forecast error. Again subtracting s t from both sides yields E t s t+1 s t = s t+1 " t+1 . The UIP condition (5) relates the forecasted change in the exchange rate to the prior interest rate di¤erential i t i t : By introducing positive weight on s t 1 in the aggregate market forecast, the CE model shifts the temporal relationship between the forecasted change of the exchange rate and the interest rate di¤erential, thus ‡ipping the sign of the slope coe¢ cient in the UIP regression.
Additional insight can obtained by substituting the ALM for s t (17) into the Taylorrule based interest rate di¤erential (9) to obtain the following equilibrium expression for the interest rate di¤erential:
where the last expression again makes use of (17). From equation (1), the sign of the UIP slope coe¢ cient 1 is governed by the sign of Cov ( s t+1 ; i t i t ) : Iterating equation (20) ahead one period and then solving for s t+1 yields s t+1 = i t+1 i t+1 = (1 ) + u t+1 which in turn implies
The right-side of the above expression will be negative so long as 0 < 1 and the interest rate di¤erential exhibits positive serial correlation, as it does in both the model and the data. Intuitively, since the interest rate di¤erential depends on the exchange rate via the Taylor-type rule, and the exchange rate depends on agents'expectations via the no-arbitrage condition (6), a departure from rational expectations that involves lagged information can shift the dynamics of the variables that appear on both sides of the UIP regression equation (1).
The corresponding derivation for the RE solution is
where we have made use of the de…nition of a x to go from line 1 to line 2, de…nition of a s to go from line 2 to line 3, and …nally the de…nitions of s t from Proposition 1 and of x t+1 to obtain the …nal result. Solving equation (22) for s t+1 yields s t+1 = (i t i t ) + a x u t+1 which in turn implies Cov ( s t+1 ; i t i t ) = V ar (i t i t ) (RE model);
such that the right-side is always positive and the slope coe¢ cient in the UIP regression is unity.
Applying the Model' s Methodology to the Data
Using the de…nition of the fundamental driving variable x t in equation (7), we construct time series for x t in Canada, Japan, and the U.K. using monthly data on the consumer price index, industrial production, and the short-term nominal interest rate di¤erential relative to the U.S. The interest rate di¤erential is computed using 3-month government bond yields. Our data are from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and covers the period January 1974 through October 2012. To construct measures of the output gap for each country, we estimate and remove a quadratic trend from the logarithm of the industrial production index. 23 In constructing the time series for x t ; we use the following calibrated values for the Taylor-rule parameters: = 0:9; g = 1:5; g y = 0:5; g s = 0:2; and = 0:98: These values are consistent with those typically employed or estimated in the monetary literature. 24 Empirical estimates of the interest rate smoothing parameter typically imply ' 0:8 for quarterly data. Since our model employs monthly data, we choose = 0:9: Given the Taylor-rule parameters, the e¤ective discount factor in our model is b 1= [1 + (1 )g s ] = 0:98: Table 2 reports summary statistics for the nominal interest rate di¤erential (relative to the U.S.) and the constructed time series for x t . As noted earlier in the discussion of equation (9), the equilibrium dynamics for i t i t will be very similar to the equilibrium dynamics for x t whenever b ' 1; as is the case here. Before proceeding with simulations from the theoretical model, we wish to examine the performance of the postulated forecast rules (12) and (13) using the exchange rate data for Canada, Japan, and the U.K. Table 3 reports the average root mean squared forecast errors (RMSFE) for four di¤erent forecast rules. The RMSFE statistics are computed sequentially using a 15-year rolling sample period and then averaged. The initial sample period is from 1974.m1 to 1988.m1. The …rst two rows of the table show the results for our postulated forecast Figure 4 : For Canada, Japan and the U.K., the use of fundamental news can improve forecast performance relative to a random walk forecast with lagged information. In all three countries, exchange rate changes exhibit low peristence, consistent with the near-random walk behavior of exchange rates. rules (12) and (13) which are associated with the Type-1 and Type-2 agents, respectively. 25 The third row shows the results of a random walk forecast using only lagged-information about the exchange rate, i.e., no fundamental news. The fourth row shows the results for a fundamentals-only forecast where the coe¢ cients f 0;t and f 1;t are estimated sequentially for each rolling sample period using data for each country's fundamental driving variable x t : Consistent with many previous studies, the top row of Table 3 shows that a random walk 2 5 To construct the Type-2 agent's forecast, we sequentially estimate the law of motion for fundamentals (8) for the rolling sample period and use the resulting parameter estimates to identify a sequence of fundamental innovations ut for that sample period. We then estimate the response coe¢ cient to fundamental news using only lagged information about the exchange rate, i.e., t 1 = Cov ( st 1; ut 1) = 2 u :
Figure 5: Top panels: Professional survey forecasts of 3-month ahead exchange rates track well with the lagged exchange rate, consistent with the Type-2 agents' subjective forecast rule (13) in the CE model. Bottom panels: Survey forecasts appear to respond to changes in the interest rate di¤erential (a proxy for fundamental news), again consistent with the Type-2 agents'subjective forecast rule. forecast using contemporaneous information (Type-1 agent forecast) has the lowest RMSFE and thus outperforms the other three forecast rules. The fundamentals-only forecast in the bottom row of the table exhibits the worst performance with the highest RMSFE. For this exercise, our main interest is asking whether the use of fundamental news can improve the performance of a random walk forecast that uses lagged information about the exchange rate. The answer is yes. Comparing the second and third rows of Table 3 shows that the use of fundamental news substantially improves forecast performance (lower RMSFE) when averaged over the entire sequence of rolling sample periods. In addition, Figure 4 also shows that the use of fundamental news can lower the RMSFE statistics (relative to a random walk forecast with lagged information) for all three country pairs using a rolling 15-year sample period. This result is particularly strong for Japan and UK. In the case of Canada, the use of fundamental news can still improve forecast performance, particularly in the more recent 15-year sample periods. The weaker results for Canada can be traced to the fact that Canada's exchange rate behaves closest to a pure random walk of the three countries. Evidence of this can be seen in the bottom right panel of Figure 4 where we plot the 15-year rolling autocorrelation of exchange rate changes Corr ( s t ; s t 1 ) : The rolling autocorrelation statistic for Canada remains closest to zero over the entire sample period, indicating the near-random walk behavior of Canada's exchange rate.
While the preceding exercise showed that the use of fundamental news can improve a lagged-information random walk forecast, it is interesting to consider some direct evidence on whether professional forecasters behave in a way that is consistent with the CE model. We noted earlier that the vast majority of professional forecasters report that they use both chart patterns and fundamentals when constructing their exchange rate forecasts. Figure 5 provides some additional evidence that professionals construct exchange rate forecasts in a way that is consistent with the Type-2 agents in the CE model.
The top panel of Figure 5 plots the 3-month ahead survey forecasts for the three countries' exchange rates versus the lagged value of the actual exchange rates, i.e., the exchange rate at time t 1: 26 For all three countries, the survey forecasts are clustered along the 45-degree line, suggesting that a lagged information random walk forecast captures much of the behavior of the professional forecasters. 27 The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows scatter plots of the forecasted 3-month ahead exchange rate changes from the survey versus the change in the interest rate di¤erentials-a proxy for fundamental news. Speci…cally, a positive change in the interest rate di¤erential i t i t is a proxy for u t since, as shown earlier, the fundamental driving variable x t is negatively correlated with the interest rate di¤erential. The scatter plots shows that survey respondents tend to forecast a negative change in the exchange rate (a forecasted appreciation) in response to a positive change in the interest rate di¤erential, which is a proxy for u t . When > 0, the Type-2 agents'subjective forecast rule (13) also predicts a negative change in the exchange rate in response to a negative realization of u t :
5 Quantitative Analysis
Numerical Solution for the Equilibrium
We now examine a numerical solution for the consistent expectations equilibrium by plotting the map T ( ) from De…nition 1. As noted earlier, the calibrated Tayor-rule parameters imply an e¤ective discount factor of b = 0:98: The parameters of the fundamental driving process (8) are chosen to achieve Std Dev (x t ) = 0:02 (i.e., 2%) and Corr (x t ; x t 1 ) = 0:95; which are close to the values observed in the data (see Table 2 ). This procedure yields u = 0:00624 and = 0:95: We calibrate the fraction of Type-1 agents who employ the contemporaneous observation s t to be = 0:5. We …nd that di¤erent values of primarily in ‡uence the size of the UIP regression slope coe¢ cient in the CE model with only minor e¤ects on the model's other quantitative properties. From equation (19) with = 0:5 and = 0:95; the CE model predicts a slope coe¢ cient of 1 = 1:9 which falls within the range of values obtained from Figure 6 : The T-map for the consistent expectations equilibrium lies very close to the 45-degree line. At the unique …xed point equilibrium, the volatility of exchange rate changes in the consistent expectations model (CE) is more than twice that of the solution to the rational expectations (RE) model. In equilibrium, the forecast errors observed by Type-1 and Type-2 agents in the CE model are both close to white noise, making it di¢ cult for agents to detect any misspeci…cation of their subjective forecast rules.
the data (see Figure 3) . As a point of comparison, Carroll (2003) uses survey data on U.S. in ‡ation forecasts to estimate a value of 0:27 for the fraction of agents who update their forecasts to the most recent information. One might expect the fraction of up-to-date agents to be higher in foreign exchange markets which are characterized by large transaction volumes and high frequency trading.
The top-left panel of Figure 6 plots the map T ( ) from De…nition 1 using the calibrated parameter values. The map crosses the 45-degree line at = 1= (1 b) = 51: The slope of the map is T 0 ( ) = b(1 )= (1 b ) = 0:96: Since the slope is less than unity, the …xed point is stable under learning, as we demonstrate in the real-time learning simulations below. Still, convergence to the equilibrium can be slow since the T-map lies very close to the 45-degree line. The top-right panel of Figure 6 plots the theoretical standard deviation of s t in the CE model as varies from 0 to 100. The horizontal line shows the corresponding standard deviation implied by the rational expectation solution. At the equilibrium value of = 51; the CE model delivers excess volatility, i.e., the volatility of s t in the CE model is nearly three times higher than the corresponding volatility in the RE model. Recall that the agents' subjective forecasts in the CE model embed a unit root assumption. Due to the self-referential nature of the no-arbitrage condition (6), the agents'subjective forecasts in ‡uence the dynamics of the object that is being forecasted. In equilibrium, the agents' perception of a unit root becomes close to self-ful…lling.
The bottom-left panel of Figure 6 shows the persistence of the forecast errors for the Type-1 and Type-2 agents. At the …xed point equilibrium, both subjective forecast rules perform well in the sense that they produce near-zero autocorrelations, making it extremely di¢ cult for the agents to detect any misspeci…cation errors.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 6 plots the theoretical standard deviation of the interest rate di¤erential i t i t . For all values of ; the volatility of i t i t in the CE model is slightly below the volatility implied by the RE solution. This result is robust to di¤erent values of : Hence, the CE model's excess volatility in s t is not being driven by excess volatility in the interest rate di¤erential but rather is driven solely by agents'expectations. Table 4 shows the theoretical moments of s t in the CE model as predicted by the perceived law of motion (11) and the actual law of motion (15). The actual moments observed by the agents are very close to those predicted by their perceived law of motion, giving no indication of any misspeci…cation. In addition, the autocorrelation structure of s t remains close to zero at all lags, reinforcing the agents'perception of unit root in the law of motion for s t : 
Forecast Error Comparison
Proposed departures from rational expectations are often criticized on the grounds that intelligent agents would eventually detect the misspeci…cation of their subjective forecast rule. We counter this criticism in two ways. First, we show that the autocorrelation structure of the forecast errors observed by the Type-1 and Type-2 agents in the CE model are close to white noise, making it di¢ cult for them to detect any misspeci…cation. Second, we show that the forecast performance of both types of agents is nearly as good as that of a hypothetical "Type-3"agent who is endowed with knowledge of the actual law of motion (15). Hence, there is very little reward available in the model for an individual agent who may wish to expend resources searching for a better forecast rule. From equations (12) and (13), the forecast errors observed by the Type-1 and Type-2 agents in the CE model are given by
where the evolution of s t is governed by the ALM (15). Now consider an atomistic Type-3 agent who understands that the evolution of s t is governed by the ALM. The hypothetical Type-3 agent cannot in ‡uence the evolution of s t but is tasked only with making forecasts. The forecast error observed by the Type-3 agent is given by
Given the forecast error expressions, it is straightforward to compute the associated autocorrelations and the root mean squared forecast errors, as given by
for i = 1; 2; 3. In all cases, the forecasts are unbiased such that E (err i;t+1 ) = 0: Within the RE model , the forecast errors observed by the fully-rational agent are given by
where have made use of the solution from Proposition 1. The above expression implies RM SF E re = a x u : Table 5 compares the moments of the various forecast errors de…ned above, as computed from model simulations. In the CE model, the autocorrelations of the forecast errors are near zero at all lags for both Type-1 and Type-2 agents, giving no signi…cant indication of a misspeci…cation. A comparison of the RM SF E values shows that the RE model exhibits the most accurate forecasts (lowest RM SF E), as expected. However, it is important to realize that an individual agent inhabiting the CE model could never achieve this level of forecast performance unless all of the other agents decided to switch to the fully-rational forecast rule. This is because the actual law of motion for the exchange rate in the CE model is permanently shifted by the presence of the Type-1 and Type-2 agents.
In the last column of Table 5 , we see that the the ALM-based forecast of the hypothetical Type-3 agent has a slightly lower RM SE of 31.8% in comparison to the values of 32.0% and 32.7% for the Type-1 and Type-2 agents, respectively. Hence, there is little room for an for the PLM parameter . The simulations con…rm that the consistent expectations equilibrium is learnable; the estimated value of eventually converges to the vicinity of the theoretical …xed point value = 51; regardless of the shock sequences or the starting value for :
individual agent in the CE model to improve forecasting performance by employing more sophisticated (and presumably more costly) econometric methods to discover the true underlying law of motion for the exchange rate. 
Model Simulations
Using the same baseline parameter values shown in Table 4 , Figure 7 plots twenty-four separate real-time learning paths (grouped by starting value) for the fundamental news response parameter . We employ four separate starting values 0 2 f31; 41, 61, 71g that initially enter the ALM (11), with each learning path subject to a di¤erent sequence of draws for the fundamental innovation u t : Each period, a new value for is computed from past observable data using equation (16) and then substituted into the ALM and so on. To speed up the learning process, we assume that agents in the CE model compute the relevant covariance in equation (16) using a 30-year (360-month) rolling sample period. The simulations con…rm that the consistent expectations equilibrium is learnable; the estimated value of eventually converges to the vicinity of the theoretical …xed point value = 51; regardless of the starting value. Figure 8 plots simulated values for s t and i t i t for both models. The simulations con…rm the theoretical results presented earlier in Table 4 ; the CE model generates considerably more volatility in s t than the RE model. This is true despite the fact that CE model exhibits slightly lower volatility for the interest rate di¤erential relative to the RE model, as shown by the bottom panels of Figure 8 . Table 6 compares the moments observed in the data to those generated by the model simulations. The CE model does a remarkably good job of matching all of the data moments. The CE model and the RE model can both generate near-random walk behavior of the exchange rate such that Corr ( s t ; s t 1 ) ' 0 and Corr ( 2 s t ; 2 s t 1 ) ' 0:5; where 2 s t s t s t 1 is the second di¤erence of the exchange rate. However, the RE model generates much lower volatility in s t and 2 s t .
The middle rows of Table 6 con…rm that the moments of the interest rate di¤erential i t i t in both models are close to those observed in the data. Finally, the bottom row of Table 6 shows that the CE model produces a negative correlation between s t+1 and the prior interest rate di¤erential i t i t : The negative correlation is consistent with the data in all three countries and with the typical negative sign of the slope coe¢ cient in the empirical UIP regressions, as discussed further below. Table 7 compares the results of UIP regressions using country data to those using modelgenerated data. In addition to the full-sample estimates for Canada, Japan, and the U.K. reported earlier in Table 1 , we now also report the mean results from 15-year rolling regressions for each country. Figure 9 presents the model-generated analogs to the country data plots that we showed earlier in Figures 1 and 3 . Speci…cally, the top panels of Figure 9 show scatter plots of the simulated exchange rate change s t+1 versus the prior interest rate di¤erential i t i t in both models. The dashed lines show the …tted relationships from the full-sample UIP regressions, with details reported in Table 7 . The bottom panels of Figure 9 plot the estimated slope coe¢ cients from UIP regressions run over a rolling 15-year sample period using model-generated data. Table 7 shows that the estimated UIP slope coe¢ cients for Canada, Japan, and the U.K. are consistently negative, illustrating the forward-premium anomaly. The R 2 statistics from these regressions are all close to zero, illustrating the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. Similar to the country data, the CE model produces negative UIP slope coe¢ cients in both the full- Figure 9 : The …tted relationship between s t+1 and i t i t in the consistent expectations (CE) model exhibits a negative slope coe¢ cient, similar to the country data plotted in Figure 1 . The estimated UIP slope coe¢ cient in the CE model exhibits considerable time variation, similar to the data estimates shown in Figure 3 . In contrast, the solution to the rational expectations (RE) model exhibits a positive UIP slope coe¢ cient with much less time variation.
UIP Regressions
sample and rolling regressions. The 95% con…dence interval around the full-sample point estimate of 2:015 would lie entirely in negative territory. The R 2 statistics are very low, similar to those in the data. Another realistic feature of the CE model, evident in the bottomleft panel of Figure 9 , is the considerable time variation in the estimated slope coe¢ cient when the UIP regressions are run using a 15-year rolling sample period. Similar time variation in the estimated slope coe¢ cients can be seen in the country-data UIP regressions plotted earlier in Figure 3 . In contrast, the rolling-regression estimates for the RE model are always in positive territory, exhibit much smaller time variation, and cluster around unity. Notice that the rolling regressions all produce larger standard errors in comparison to the corresponding full-sample regressions. This is partly due to the smaller sample size and partly due to a correction of the estimation bias that can arise in the presence of a persistent regressor. 28 Interestingly, the RE model can account for the exchange rate disconnect puzzle as it produces a very small R 2 statistic in both the full-sample and rolling regressions. This result is consistent with the arguments put forth by West (2005, 2006) who show that a fully-rational model with highly-persistent fundamentals and a discount factor close to unity can deliver near-random walk behavior of the exchange rate such that changes in the exchange rate are nearly unpredictable using fundamentals. Still, the RE model fails to account for the forward premium anomaly and woefully underpredicts the observed volatility of exchange rate changes in the data (Table 6 ). 
Concluding Remarks
A reading of the last three decades of academic research on exchange rates highlights numerous puzzles and anomalies that have stubbornly resisted explanation, particularly in the context of models where all agents are fully-rational. This paper showed that a plausible small departure from full rationality-in the form of boundedly-rational agents who augment a lagged-information random walk forecast with contemporaneous news about Taylor-rule fundamentals-can account for several empirical exchange rate puzzles, including the apparent disconnect from fundamentals, the extremely high volatility of exchange rate changes relative to that of cross-country interest rate di¤erentials, and the failure of exchange rates to satisfy the UIP condition. Given that real-world exchange rates exhibit near-random walk behavior, it makes sense that agents would adopt a forecast rule that allows for a unit root. Our model setup is also consistent with survey data which shows that: (1) professional exchange rate forecasts track well with the lagged value of the exchange rate, and (2) professional forecasts respond to movements in fundamental news, as measured by changes in cross-country interest rate di¤erentials.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic equation of the stochastic di¤erence equation (6) Since (r 1 1)(r 2 1) < 0; one root is greater than one and the other is less than one. Also because r 1 r 2 > 0 and r 1 + r 2 > 0 it must be true that both roots are positive. Therefore we can conclude that one root is greater than unity and the other root is positive but less than unity. Since we have one initial condition that pins down s t 1 ; there exists a unique rational expectation solution (Blanchard and Kahn 1980) . We postulate that the solution to equation (6) takes the form: s t = a s s t 1 + a x x t , where a s and a x are undetermined coe¢ cients. Iterating the postulated solution ahead one period and taking the rational expectation yields E t s t+1 = a s s t +a x x t . Substituting this expectation into (6) and collecting terms yields where V ar(x t ) = 2 u = 1 2 :
C Appendix: Moments with Consistent Expectations
Using the actual laws of motion (15) and (17), straightforward but tedious computations yield the following unconditional moments. 
